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The purpose of this paper is to account for varieties of organizational change.
In particular, we contend that in order to explain change in international organizations
(IOs) we cannot simply dichotomize between change and the lack thereof. Rather,
change is best conceptualized as made up of two dimensions: speed and scope.
The combination of the two dimensions leads to a taxonomy with four distinct types
of policy change. The paper evaluates the emergence of different types of change by
focusing on the relationship between IOs and their fields. Specifically, the position of the
organization in the field helps to account for the speed of change (slow vs. rapid),
whereas the openness of the organization to the inputs coming from the field helps to
explain the scope of change (incremental vs. radical). We illustrate our argument
by comparing the changes in the International Monetary Fund’s policies in the areas of
financial sector surveillance and poverty reduction.
Keywords: international organizations; policy change; institutionalism; organizational
field; IMF
Introduction
In recent years, the scholarship on international organizations (IOs) has become
increasingly interested in studying the process of change that takes place within
IOs. In particular, scholars have started asking how, why, and when change occurs
(Barnett and Coleman, 2005). The research interest in explaining policy change in
IOs spans across the rationalist–constructivist spectrum. From a rationalist per-
spective, policy change in IOs is accounted for either as the result of a deliberate
choice made by member states (Koremenos et al., 2001), or as information
asymmetries and disagreements among principals over the precise goals with
which to task IOs (Nielson and Tierney, 2003). Indeed, using a principal–agent
(PA) framework, these latter factors may enhance the room for ‘agency slack’
within IOs – to shirk tasks or engage in activities that were not expressly man-
dated by member states or that directly contravene members’ aims (Hawkins
et al., 2006). From a constructivist perspective, several scholars have started
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investigating the endogenous, organization-specific factors that help account for
changes. For instance, it has been found that organizational cultures and com-
petition among internal units and departments affect the process of policy change
(Willets, 2000; Momani, 2005; Lipson, 2007; Weaver, 2008; Chwieroth, 2010;
Park, 2010; Steffek, 2010).
Interestingly, however, most of these studies offer a limited understanding of the
concept of change. Change is largely treated as a dichotomous variable that takes
on the values of present/absent. This may be attributed to research questions and
designs, with scholars having primarily focused on the triggers of change – and
here the debate was often set up in the interest-idea divide – by investigating cases
of formal change, such as treaty changes or decisions voted on by state repre-
sentatives. In doing so, however, existing studies of IOs fall into the trap of an
either/or fallacy: they suggest that only two choices are possible, that is, change
vs. no change, when more options really exist.
This paper attempts to redress this fallacy by unpacking the dependent variable
‘change’.1 That is to say, we contend that in order to explain change in IOs, we
cannot simply dichotomize between change and the lack thereof. Rather, change is
best conceptualized as made up of two dimensions, that is speed and scope.
The combination of the two dimensions leads to a taxonomy with four distinct
types of policy change: layering, conversion, displacement, and dismantlement.
Although these types are borrowed from historical institutionalism, their meaning
and content do not always perfectly coincide with those prevalent in this strand of
scholarship – as will be clarified at greater length below. Based on this taxonomy,
we suggest a number of hypotheses that help explain why a specific type of change
materializes. In particular, we draw from sociological institutionalism, and
identify the factors that help to explain the variation in the types of change in the
relationship between the IO and its organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell,
1983). As illustrated in Table 1, the position of the organization in the field helps
to account for the speed of change (slow vs. rapid), whereas the openness of the
organization to the inputs coming from the field helps to explain the scope of
change (incremental vs. radical).
In order to itemize our argument, the paper provides empirical illustrations of
the changes in the policies of a preeminent international economic organization,
that is, the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In particular, we undertake
a focused comparison between the policy changes through which the Fund
became responsible for financial sector surveillance and poverty reduction. Next
to this cross-issue analysis, this study also relies on a longitudinal, within-case
comparison. Indeed, both issue areas are characterized by important changes in
the organizational fields in the late 1990s following the emerging market crises of
1 In doing so, our theoretical framework is not intended to explore the conditions under which no
change takes place. In other words, distinguishing between change/no change, our article solely opens up
and investigates what happens within the ‘change’ camp.
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the decade. Using this development as a natural experiment, we thus show how
the changes within the same organizational field over time altered the config-
urations of IO–field relationships. These new configurations, in turn, influenced
the type of policy change that eventually materialized.
Before proceeding, some clarifications are required concerning the objectives of
this paper and its research design and methods. First, the primary purpose of this
paper is that of explaining the emergence of different types of change. In doing so,
we argue and illustrate that, although member state preferences and bureaucratic
culture may help explain why change is initiated in the first place, these same
factors alone cannot explain why a specific type of change materializes and
another does not.
Second, the dependent variable of this study is the change in the policies
that the IMF pursues. Specifically, we investigate what elements have been
altered over time in the way the IMF carries out its surveillance functions
and engages with the problem of poverty reduction. This is not to suggest that
institutional changes are not important. As the empirical sections will show,
policy changes often bring about changes in the institutional structure. More
narrowly, however, and in order to facilitate the testing of our theoretical claims,
the types of change we investigate are those that relate to the policies that the
IMF pursues.
Third, it is important to clarify from the outset the modalities through which
we discriminate among different levels of policy change. Measuring change is a
controversial activity. The assessment of the nature of change can for instance be
hindered by one’s theoretical viewpoint. Hence, what may be a rapid, radical
change from a macro-theoretical perspective can be a slow process of adaptation
if one adopts a microanalytical perspective (Capano and Howlett, 2009: 7). While
this paper does not provide definitive answers on how to solve these crucial
problems in the measurement of policy change, our study is based on an explicit
and parsimonious understanding of different types of policy change that is
applied to the empirical analysis. In particular, in order to discriminate between
incremental and radical change (i.e. the scope of change), we borrow from Peter
Hall’s (1993) distinction between first-, second-, and third-order change that
refers to changes in the settings, instruments, and goals of a policy, respectively.
Table 1. Taxonomy of policy change within IOs based on their relationship with
the organizational field
Central position Peripheral position
Slow change Rapid change
Low openness Incremental change Layering Displacement
High openness Radical change Conversion Dismantlement
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Whereas first- and second-order changes are here regarded as incremental, third-
order changes are regarded as radical. As for the timing of change, the metric used
here is that change is slow when there is a temporal mismatch between the adoption
of a decision and its actual implementation or between the public recognition of a
policy problem and the action taken to solve it. We do not provide a quantitative
benchmark against which to assess the slowness/rapidity of change because of the
comparative nature of this study. That is to say, the tempo of change is not an
absolute but relative variable here that will be ascertained by cross-case comparison.
Finally, some clarifications are needed with regard to the research design used to
advance our claims on the importance of organizational fields to the varieties of
policy change. While the concept of organizational field is extensively presented in the
next sections, it is important to clarify from the outset that organizational fields vary
across issue areas and change over time. As a result, the first step of a field analysis
usually requires the mapping of the relevant actors and the actor positions in the field
(Leander, 2010). For the purposes of this study we adopt an inductive approach. This
means that the identity and the positions of the actors in the fields under investigation
cannot be pre-determined ex ante but are a matter of empirical investigation. In doing
so, we relied on both secondary literature, such as scholarly studies and practitioner
reports on the issues under investigation, and first-hand material. Archival documents
and interviews with IMF staff members were particularly important to identify the
relevant actors the organization engaged with in its processes of change.
The arguments in the paper are developed in three steps. After reviewing
existing scholarship on policy change in IOs, we clarify the theoretical claims that
guide the empirical analysis and illustrate our taxonomy of policy change. The
following sections provide the empirical evidence to sustain our arguments,
analyzing the IMF’s involvement with financial sector surveillance and poverty
reduction, respectively. The last section concludes by reflecting on the findings and
detailing the implications of our study for the literature on IOs.
IOs and policy change
During the past decade, IO scholars have expanded their research agendas beyond
the study of IO creation and influence on member states and world politics by
analyzing the causes of policy change. The work of Michael Barnett and Martha
Finnemore (2004, 1999) has been highly influential in this regard. By demon-
strating that IOs are agents in their own right because of their ability to define
meanings and shape expectations, the authors opened the way for investigating IO
pathologies, conflicts, and cleavages that influence their behavior. Following on
from these insights, constructivist-oriented scholarship has made pioneering forays
into the study of IO change. Borrowing from organizational sociology, the role
that bureaucratic culture plays in shaping change has been particularly high-
lighted (Bebbington et al., 2006; Vetterlein, 2007; Weaver, 2008; Chwieroth,
2010; Park, 2010; Steffek, 2010).
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While Barnett and Finnemore’s work (2004, 1999) has been particularly
influential for constructivist scholars, the turn toward the study of the inner
workings of IOs is also evident in rationalist explanations. PA models have
shown how organizations change their policies within the parameters set by the
PA terms of delegation. That is to say, change is either the result of principals’
decisions to expand/reduce an IO’s mandate (Koremenos et al., 2001; Elsig,
2011), or of the room of maneuver the IO enjoys under the existing terms of
delegation (Cortell and Peterson, 2006). In the attempt to bridge the divide
between constructivist and PA explanations, a number of scholars have also
integrated the logic of a rationalist PA model – focusing on terms of delegation –
and the logic of sociological constructivism – focusing on the transformation of
bureaucratic culture (Barnett and Coleman, 2005; Hawkins et al., 2006; Nielson
et al., 2006; Clegg, 2010; Moschella, 2009).
While both constructivist and rationalist studies have unveiled important
factors that help explain the causes of organizational change, the problem of
defining and identifying different types of change has gone largely ignored. This is
not to say that there are no clues in the literature to answer the question as to what
type of change takes place. Rather, explanations based on the ‘bureaucratic culture’
implicitly suggest that this factor is linked to slow-moving changes: culture takes
time to be changed (Lipson, 2007; Weaver, 2008). As Catherine Weaver (2008: 5)
puts it studying the World Bank, ‘culture is not immutable. But by its nature, culture
changes slowly and incrementally, in a path-dependent fashion often at odds with
the direction and pace of change in the organization’s environment’. Building on PA
explanations, it is possible to extrapolate other hypotheses regarding the type of
change. For instance, PA theory seems to suggest that the bigger the discretion
accorded to the IO, or the larger the agreement on change among member states, the
more profound change will be (Koremenos et al., 2001). Nevertheless, these
hypotheses are implicitly rather than explicitly theorized and have not been
systematically tested. In what follows, we thus start filling in this gap by identifying
different types of change and offering an explanation that combines the insights of
historical and sociological institutionalism.
Explaining varieties of policy change within IOs: the importance
of organizational fields
For the purpose of this study, we conceive of change as made up of two dimensions:
speed and scope. Their combination gives rise to four different types of change in the
policies of an IO. The main characteristics of each type are summarized in Table 2.
While we borrow from the HI literature for the labels used to describe different
types of change,2 our definitions do not always perfectly coincide with those
2 For important attempts at testing and applying the insights developed within historical institu-
tionalism to international studies, see Dannreuther (2010) and Fioretos (2011).
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prevalent in this strand of scholarship as the description of each type of change
below will illustrate.
Layering is the type of change that takes place by adding new institutions rather
than dismantling the old. In other words, change by layering entails the addition
of new policy settings and instruments on top of existing ones (e.g. Thelen, 2004;
Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Conversion instead refers to the process of change that
takes place when policies are adapted over time by shifting existing instruments
and practices to new ends (Thelen, 2003). The two types share the same tempo;
both are slow-moving types of change. Indeed, the underlying assumption is
that proponents of change face political–institutional barriers that prevent the
occurrence of rapid changes through the dismantlement of existing policies
outright (Hacker, 2004). Nevertheless, layering and conversion differ in terms of
scope. Whereas layering primarily entails a change in the settings and instruments
through which existing policies operate, conversion is a more extensive type
of change because it involves the redirection of existing policies to new purposes.
As Kathleen Thelen (2003: 226) puts it, conversion entails ‘changes in the role
[institutions] perform and/or the functions they serve’.
The third and fourth types of change are those of dismantlement and displacement.
It is worth noting that the HI literature has extensively investigated the concept of
displacement rather than dismantlement primarily because the latter is often featured
in leading institutional theories based on the notion of exogenous/punctuated change.
Nevertheless, Mahoney and Thelen (2010: 16) have recently suggested that dis-
placement can be both abrupt and gradual. We thus build on this insight in order to
identify two different types of change.
Specifically, dismantlement refers to a type of change where existing policies are
dismissed and replaced with new ones. In other words, in contrast to layering and
conversion where the old policies remain in place but are amended through the
introduction of new instruments and redirection to new purposes, dismantlement
entails the eradication of old policies. When dismantlement takes place, the new
policies differ from previous ones in terms of both the instruments used to achieve
specific goals and the same goals the policy is expected to pursue.
Similarly to dismantlement, displacement involves the rapid introduction of
new institutions and policies, usually as a result of policy failures and accumulation
Table 2. Different types of policy change in IO
Type of Change Characteristics Dynamics
Layering Incremental/slow Adding-on of new policy settings and instruments
Conversion Radical/slow Redirection of existing instruments to new policy goals
Dismantlement Radical/rapid Eradication of existing policies through the adoption of
new instruments and policy goals
Displacement Incremental/rapid Introduction of competing policy models
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of new knowledge. As Mahoney and Thelen (2010: 16) put it, ‘the rapid, sudden
breakdown of institutions and their replacement with new ones that accompanies
revolutions obviously involves displacement’. Although both dismantlement and
displacement are examples of rapid change, especially when compared with con-
version and layering, they differ in the scope of the change involved. Whereas dis-
mantlement involves the replacement of old policy instruments and goals with new
ones, displacement is a more incremental type of change in that new models of doing
things are introduced and directly compete with (rather than supplement) established
policies. As an increased number of actors defect to the new models, change may
eventually take place (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 19–22).
Having identified different types of change, the theoretical framework we
suggest in this paper is explicitly devoted to identify the factors that help explain
the emergence of each of these. Seen from this perspective, we significantly move
beyond the HI literature that has long been criticized for advancing more thick
descriptions than theoretical explanations of change (e.g. Gorges, 2001). Fur-
thermore, while historical institutionalism assumes that change is intrinsically
incremental, we move beyond this understanding by suggesting a theoretical
explanation of both incremental and radical change.3 Specifically, our theoretical
argument links the relationship of the IO with its organizational field to the
emergence of different types of change.
The concept of organizational field is borrowed from DiMaggio and Powell’s
work, inspired by Bourdieu, where a field is defined as ‘those organizations that, in
the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life’ (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983: 148). A field has three defining characteristics: a specific object around
which the field constitutes itself (in our case the specific policy issue); power relations
among the participating actors; and emerging norms and rules that become the ‘rules
of the game’ over time (see also Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2009). This process, which
is known as structuration, takes place as a constant struggle over the respective object
that is at stake in the field, in our case the respective policy (see Fligstein, 2008).
In this sense, field comes close to ‘regimes’ defined as explicit and implicit norms and
rules around which the expectations of relevant actors converge in a given issue area
(Krasner, 1983). In contrast to regime theory, however, the field concept is more
explicit on the power relationships among the actors within the field.
Applying the concept of organizational field to the study of IOs, our analysis
starts from the investigation of the power positioning of the IMF in a particular
policy area and moves on to examine how the rules of the game – that is, the
content of policies – are (re)shaped through the constant interaction between the
organization and the actors in the relevant policy field. As already anticipated,
the actors that belong to the field are inductively investigated, so that their identity
is not defined ex ante based on the application of a specific theoretical model.
3 We are indebted to one of the anonymous referees for having drawn attention to this important
point.
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This is also the case because organizational fields are not stable but continuously
subject to change via the workings of the process of structuration (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983: 148). According to the issue area under investigation, then, relevant
actors can include states, other IOs, professional groups, official agencies, and
private sector actors.
While the identity of the actors is the subject of empirical investigation, the
theoretical expectation that is derived from the application of the concept
of organizational field is that micro-level social interactions help explain the
emergence of specific (policy) norms (Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2009). Extending
these insights to the realm of IOs, we thus investigate the process of social
interaction between the IO and its fields. In this connection, we argue that the
relationship between the organization and its field can be conceptualized as made
up of different levels of exchange. That is to say, it is possible to conceptualize the
IO, in our case the IMF, as a policy subsystem that is more or less open to external
inputs and stimuli (Sabatier, 1998: 99).
Based on these insights, we advance two theoretical claims in order to
explain the different types of change identified above. First, the position of the
IO in the field determines the speed through which change materializes. Second,
the openness of the organization to its field helps account for the scope of change
(see Table 1).
Positioning and speed of change
In order to explain the logic that underpins our first theoretical claim, it is worth
recalling that, within each organizational field, all actors assume a position that
derives from the resources available and relevant to the field. This ‘position-taking’ is
an act of acquiring certain capital that, in turn, affects the actions of an organization
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Position-taking, however, is not solely the result
of deliberate action. Rather, positions may derive from past actions and expertise.
Furthermore, positions may also derive from historical processes, where some actors
gain a first-mover advantage by appearing first in a field and accumulating expertise
and organizational resources that are recognized as relevant in the field at a specific
point in time (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Within IO studies, the existence of
differing positions is often implicitly recognized. For instance, IOs are sometimes
regarded as being in complementary but not conflicting positions, especially for the
governance of the global economic and financial system (Porter, 2005; Abbott and
Snidal, 2010). The co-existence of multiple institutions in a given issue area is also
regarded as a crucial factor for accounting for the ability of IOs to perform their
functions effectively (Gutner and Thompson, 2010: 244).
Building on these insights, by ‘position’ we mean the status granted to an
organization in solving a collective problem at a specific point in time based on the
capital an actor holds (Bourdieu, 1993). Position is a property that derives from past
actions and expertise, but it is also intersubjective as it depends on the collective
understandings of the actors operating in a field. In particular, we distinguish between
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central and peripheral positions, according to whether the organization is largely
recognized as the preeminent actor in solving the problems of a specific issue area or,
in contrast, whether it is a supporting or more marginal actor in its field.
Position is relevant to the purposes of this study because it allows speculation
about the speed that change will take. Indeed, the hypothesis is that organizations
that occupy a central role in the field will be constrained by existing practices,
routines, and expertise. That is to say, IOs face the legacy of the past, including
well-developed practices to solve problems, knowledge developed over time, and
long-standing experience that set an example of how to act in the future. Existing
habits and routines are also ‘a structural obstacle to social change’ (Neumann,
2007; Hopf, 2010: 540). Given these constraints, change is more likely to be slow
moving than rapid (see for instance Bebbington et al., 2006).
In contrast, in peripheral organizations, the speed of change is more likely to be
rapid because of the lack of constraining factors. That is to say, without the scripts
of actions crystallized in routines and habits, organizations will change more
rapidly, developing new knowledge and organizational structures. For instance,
comparative economic studies on transition economies show that the main
obstacle to the creation of new tax systems is the existence of personnel in public
administrations schooled in the old ways (Nsouli, 1999). Furthermore, peripheral
organizations are more likely to change their policies rapidly because they can
take advantage of the strategies and information developed by organizations that
stand at the center of the organizational field.4
Of course, this is not to suggest that peripheral organizations do not face
obstacles to change. On the contrary, for change to be instantiated into organi-
zational practices, these organizations must tackle internal and external opposi-
tion that is often based on adherence to existing mandates. That is to say, change
in peripheral organizations requires overcoming resistance to change that derives
from the scope of organizational mandate and expertise.
Openness and scope of change
Our second claim is that the scope of change is linked to the interaction between
the organization and other actors in its field. Indeed, closed policy subsystems
usually constrain change favoring the emergence of incremental rather than
radical changes. In the absence of external stimuli, the actors involved in the
decision-making process tend to rely on what they know and on the instruments
they have experience with. Once a particular degree of institutionalization is
reached it becomes difficult to break with the established rules of the game, or as
Pierson (2000) would argue, past choices get locked-in. In this context, profession-
alism is also important. As Barnett and Finnemore show (2004: 40), professional
training ‘actively seeks to shape the normative orientation and worldviews of those
4 This is what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) call ‘mimetic change’.
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who are trained’. As a result, an organization staffed with trained experts in a
particular policy area tends to insulate itself from outside pressure.
In contrast, the expected policy change will be the most radical when the
subsystem opens up. For instance, Baumgartner and Jones (1991) have shown
that US civil nuclear policy was significantly altered by the mid-1960s because the
policy subsystem made up of government and industry leaders lost control over
the policy debate due to the involvement of a number of previously marginalized
actors, from state and local governments to financial markets and public opinion.
Similar insights can be found in the literature on IOs. For instance, the biggest
transformations in IMF policies were introduced in times of economic or financial
crises that led the Fund to interact with some of the actors that operate outside the
organization, be that NGOs, the community of academic economists, or private
sector groups (Broome, 2010; Moschella, 2010; Park and Vetterlein, 2010).
Combining the insights derived from the position of the IO in its field and the
degree of openness, we thus expect different types of change according to whether
the IO is a central or peripheral organization in the relevant field and whether its
interaction with the actors in the field is low or high (Table 1). Specifically,
layering and conversion are the types of change we expect to find in central
organizations with closed and open policy subsystems, respectively. Displacement
and dismantlement are, instead, the types of change we expect to find in per-
ipheral organizations with closed and open policy subsystems, respectively.
In what follows, we illustrate these four types of change by analyzing the
evolution of the policies of the IMF in the issue areas of financial sector surveillance
and poverty reduction. As we will see, different types of change come about by the
combination of different relationships between the IMF and its fields.
Organizational fields and the configuration of policy change
The IMF and the field of financial sector surveillance
According to Article IV of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF is mandated
to oversee the international monetary system and monitor the economic and
financial policies of its member countries. Surveillance is one of the core tasks the
IMF performs (Guitia`n, 1992); in contrast to poverty reduction, the IMF also
occupies a primary position among the international bodies tasked to monitor the
economies of countries. Indeed, other IOs carry out surveillance activities, but
they do that over a more limited membership and with a more limited mandate
(i.e. the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Bank
for International Settlements). As Schinasi and Edwin Truman (2010: 25) put it,
‘the IMF does not have a monopoly on [surveillance] issues among international
organizations, but its mandate and near-universal membership guarantee the IMF
the widest scope and respect’. Although today’s surveillance covers virtually all
aspects of countries’ economic and financial choices, the original core of Fund
surveillance was macroeconomics. Over time, however, the scope of surveillance
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has been significantly expanded, leading the Fund to focus on issues that were
previously relegated to the sidelines of its monitoring activity. The incorporation
of financial sector issues into the scope of IMF surveillance illustrates this trans-
formation well and to this process we now turn.
Layering
The changes to the Fund’s surveillance that led the organization to focus on
domestic financial sector policies can be traced back to the period that followed
the 1994 Mexican crisis. Although the Fund had already been involved with
financial sector surveillance since the 1980s, through the publication of regular
reports and analyses, the Mexican crisis provided the catalyst for expanding the
scope of that surveillance (Gola and Spadafora, 2009: 3). In particular, the crisis
offered a conspicuous example of the implications of weak financial systems and
of the speed with which financial vulnerabilities spread across the globe.
Given the disruptions caused by the crisis, the reform of global financial
architecture, including the activity of the Fund, gained saliency on the interna-
tional political agenda. In the communique´ released after the June 1995 Halifax
summit, for instance, the representatives of the most industrialized economies
stressed the need to reform and strengthen the powers of the international
financial institutions to ensure that the international community remains able to
manage ‘the risks inherent in the growth of private capital flows’ (G7, 1995).
Among other measures, the G7 called on the IMF to improve the efficiency of its
surveillance by developing an ‘early warning system’, based on ‘benchmarks for
the timely publication of key economic and financial data;y a procedure for the
regular public identification of countries which comply within these benchmarks’
(G7, 1995).
Although the calls for reform coming from its most powerful members can help
explain why the IMF started reforming its surveillance in line with rationalist
expectations, explaining the type of change that took place requires expanding our
analysis to the relationship of the Fund with its field. Both long-standing experience
and routines for surveillance reports and the limited interaction with actors outside
the Fund combined to bring about a type of change based on layering.
Indeed, and in spite of the support for reform coming from the G7 countries,
the changes to the Fund’s surveillance did not materialize quickly as a response to
the crisis. For instance, although the Executive Board adopted new operational
guidelines for staff involved in surveillance activity, which explicitly mandated the
coverage of financial sector issues in surveillance reports (IMF, 1995), until the
late 1990s, the analysis of domestic financial sectors was only a marginal com-
ponent in IMF surveillance reports.5 For instance, the 1997 March Review of IMF
bilateral surveillance pointed at a limited ability of Article IV mission teams to
5 IMF Archives, SM/97/32, Capital Account Convertibility and the Role of the Fund-Review of
Experience and Consideration of a Possible Amendment of the Articles. February 5, 1997, pp. 37–40.
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identify banking problems as one of the major shortcomings of Fund surveillance
(IMF, 1997a: 29). In a similar vein, the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO, 2005: 4)
noted that, although the Fund ‘acknowledged the need for a sound financial system in
order to minimize the risks of liberalization’, its advice to member countries ‘largely
remained at the conceptual level and did not lead to operational advice on pre-
conditions, pace, and sequencing until later in the 1990s’.
This slow-moving dynamic can primarily be explained in light of the Fund’s
central position in the field of international economic surveillance and its domi-
nant surveillance culture, as constructivist scholars would suggest. In particular,
the availability of well-established surveillance instruments that reflected the
dominant macroeconomic culture of the organization led to a process of adjustment
during which financial sector issues were incorporated into Article IV surveillance
only ‘gradually’ and selectively (IMF, 1997a: 41; 1997b: 21).
Furthermore, the scope of the changes that were adopted did not entail a radical
transformation of the Fund’s existing instruments and practices. Rather, change
took place incrementally with IMF staff members and Executive Directors
grafting new policy instruments on top of existing ones (e.g. Moschella, 2011).
For instance, the Fund developed a framework for sound banking and identified a
list of indicators to assess the soundness of the banking system. In other words,
new instruments were added to the Fund’s traditional macroeconomic toolkit for
the conduct of surveillance with the aim of expanding the stock of information
and analysis on financial market developments and banking sector issues.
The Fund’s central position in the field of international economic surveillance may
once again help explain this distinct type of change in that past experiences and
well-established routines in the conduct of surveillance set the parameters within
which change could take place. Under these conditions, the coverage of banking
and financial sector issues was done only in those circumstances where those
issues might have macroeconomic significance (IMF, 1997a: 41).
Conversion
If until late in the 1990s, the major changes to the Fund’s surveillance had taken
place at the level of the modalities through which surveillance was exercised,
more radical changes were adopted, starting at the end of the 1990s when the
Fund explicitly redirected its surveillance to the coverage of financial sector issues.
To this end, a new surveillance instrument was created, namely the Financial
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). The FSAP was explicitly tailored to the task
of monitoring the financial sector policies of member countries.6 In other words,
IMF surveillance was redirected from the goal of macroeconomic surveillance to
the goal of financial sector surveillance.
6 In contrast to Article IV, however, FSAP reports are not obligatory, with the exception of system-
atically important countries for which financial stability assessments under the FSAP are a mandatory
part of Article IV surveillance.
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The conversion in the Fund’s policy is associated with an increased interaction
between the Fund’s subsystem and the field of international economic surveil-
lance. This interaction helped unlock the process of change by freeing it from the
constrained process that had characterized the previous round of reform. Indeed,
in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, which renewed skepticism about the effec-
tiveness of Fund surveillance,7 IOs other than the IMF took the lead in the process
of international financial supervision through the launch of the international
financial standards initiative. The fact that weaknesses in domestic financial
sectors – substantial foreign borrowing by the private sector and a weak and
overexposed banking system – significantly contributed to the severity of the
Asian crisis and its contagion supported the view according to which global
financial stability could be achieved by the world-wide adoption of financial
standards modeled upon those of the advanced economies (Walter, 2008).
The responsibility to elaborate the financial standards that could help in the
prevention of financial instability was distributed among a variety of international
bodies, including the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), the Financial Action Task
Force on Money Laundering (FATF), the International Association of Insurance
Supervisors (IAIS), the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), and the IMF among others. The Financial Stability Board (FSB), in turn,
compiled a compendium of existing international prudential standards, from
which it identified 12 as priorities to be promoted worldwide.
While the IMF became responsible for developing standards in the areas of
monetary and fiscal transparency and on data dissemination, it was also man-
dated to help in the assessment of compliance with the international financial
standards developed by the other standard-setter bodies (Walter, 2008). The FSAP
can thereby be read as an attempt to respond to the need to collaborate with the
other actors operating in the field of international surveillance. As IMF staff
recall in one of the IMF’s reviews on the standards and codes initiative, the FSAP
was initiated ‘in response to calls by the international community [y] to facilitate
early detection of financial sector vulnerabilities and development needs [y]
and enhance effective collaboration between the Bank and the Fund’ (IMF,
2003: 8). Indeed, in developing and emerging market countries, FSAPs are
conducted jointly with the World Bank. Next to the World Bank, the FSAP
was also conceived of as an instrument ‘to continue to strengthen [the Fund’s]
collaborative efforts and to agree on and adhere to an appropriate division of
labor with other international organizations’, including the OECD, and the BCBS
(IMF, 2000: 6).
7 Similar to the Mexican crisis, the Fund failed to identify the growing weaknesses in the East Asian
economies. Its surveillance also failed in anticipating the contagion effects that spread from the collapse
of the Thai currency (see, for instance, Radelet and Sachs, 1998).
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If increasing interaction with the other actors operating in the field contributed to
the redirection of IMF surveillance toward financial sector issues, the process of
change continued to be constrained by the Fund’s macroeconomic expertise and pre-
existing surveillance practices. As a result, although change was more radical than
that adopted after the Mexican crisis, it was still slow moving. In particular, the
recognition of the importance of financial sector issues to macroeconomic stability
did not find an outright application in IMF surveillance practices because the Fund’s
long-standing experience and routines for macroeconomic surveillance slowed down
the development of financial sector surveillance. For instance, in order to guide IMF
staff members’ approaches to financial sector issues, the organization adopted the
so-called ‘macroeconomic relevance test’ (Gola and Spadafora, 2009: 45). That is to
say, staff members were expected to cover non-core issues such as financial sector
issues in their analyses only to ‘the extent to which they actively and directly impinge
upon the effective conduct of macroeconomic policy’ (IMF, 1999: 63). As a result,
financial sector surveillance was only slowly developed over time. The slow embrace
of financial sector surveillance is also evident in the Fund’s performance in the
run-up to the global financial crisis that burst in 2007. Indeed, in the run-up to the
crisis, staff continued to focus on macroeconomic factors such as global imbalances
and disorderly dollar decline as the key risks to global stability, underestimating the
risks building up in the financial sector (IEO, 2011).
In sum, in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, the Fund’s policy subsystem
found itself in a position where it was to collaborate with other IOs that
exercise economic and financial surveillance. This interaction significantly con-
tributed to the process of change that materialized in the late 1990s. Indeed,
whereas in the mid-1990s the Fund layered new modalities and instruments on
top of existing ones, in the late 1990s the goal of surveillance was redirected to the
coverage of financial sector issues. In spite of the more radical transformation
than that which took place in the mid-1990s, the process of change in Fund
surveillance continued along the slow path initiated in the mid-1990s, primarily
because of the constraints imposed by its prevalent macroeconomic expertise and
organizational structure.
The IMF and the field of poverty reduction
According to its Articles of Agreement, the objectives the IMF is expected to
pursue are the promotion of international monetary cooperation, balanced
growth of international trade, and stability of the exchange rate system. Whereas
the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income
explicitly figure in the Fund’s mandate, the same does not hold for the objective of
poverty reduction and social development. Indeed, the institutional design set up
at Bretton Woods in 1944 attributed the primary responsibility for poverty
reduction to the World Bank and not the IMF. Hence, in contrast to the Fund’s
role in financial surveillance, in the field of poverty reduction it occupies a per-
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ipheral position. Nevertheless, over time, the Fund has become increasingly
involved with this issue, especially in designing its financial assistance programs.
Displacement
Although the first evidence of IMF engagement with poverty and social issues can
be traced back to the 1970s, when key research was produced on these issues
(IMF, 1976, 1979a, 1979b), IMF involvement with the fight against poverty
materialized in the late 1980s. It is in this period that formal policy changes were
adopted pushing the organization into the field of poverty reduction. Among the
most important changes, the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF)
in 1986, followed by the Enhanced SAF (ESAF) 1 year later, certainly stands out.
As has been noted for the case study on surveillance, an important factor behind
the Fund’s engagement with poverty reduction can be found in the preferences of
leading member states – in this case, the United States pushed the Fund to adopt a
basic needs approach in the late 1970s (Gerster, 1982). Furthermore, the evolution
of the Fund’s bureaucratic culture, well exemplified by the Managing Director
Michel Camdessus’ call for ‘high-quality growth’,8 is another key factor explaining
the IMF’s involvement with poverty. If state preferences and bureaucratic culture are
certainly important in identifying the permissive causes of organizational change,
explaining the type of change that unfolded requires engaging with the relationship
between the Fund and the relevant organizational field. Indeed, the IMF’s embrace
of poverty reduction took place quite rapidly. Although incrementally, in line with
the expectations associated with the type of change defined here as displacement.
Starting from the mid-1980s, the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) pro-
duced three successive studies on the distributional impact of Fund programs (see
IMF, 1986; Heller et al., 1988; Gupta and Nashashibi, 1990). Since the Fund had
virtually no experience with the issue of poverty reduction, the development of
new knowledge on these issues was not constrained by old practices and routines
as was the case in the area of surveillance in the 1990s. This circumstance favored
the rapid accumulation of new knowledge in this area and the emergence of
operational guidelines on how to incorporate income distribution in IMF financial
assistance programs that came to compete with existing internal practices. The
guidelines contained in IMF staff papers provided the basis for the Executive
Board’s decision making.9 In particular, in January 1988, the Executive Board
decided to reform the SAF and the ESAF to include policy measures that would
enhance income distribution. Furthermore, acting upon the advice of the Devel-
opment Committee, the IMF embraced the use of social safety nets as a policy tool
aimed at mitigating the adverse social impacts of macroeconomic stabilization
programs (Development Committee, 1990: 28). This was followed by Camdessus’
8 ‘High quality growth’ included the objective of reducing poverty and improving equality (IMF/FAD,
1998: 1).
9 The papers were later published in the Fund’s Occasional Paper Series.
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calling on staff to include an analysis of social costs in all Fund programs as well
as create poverty files for all low-income countries (LICs). The FAD was supposed
to take care of these developments and coordinate initiatives in the Fund
(Boughton, 2001).
Although the IMF enjoyed greater room for maneuver in the area of poverty
reduction than in surveillance due to the absence of constraining old practices
and routines, the policy changes that were adopted at the end of the 1990s were
more incremental than radical. Indeed, the changes in the SAF and ESAF were
confined to a number of policy settings such as the provision for assisting
member countries in evaluating the implications of Fund programs for income
distribution and poverty and the calls for strengthening the staff’s understanding
on poverty issues in collaboration with other UN institutions, in particular the
World Bank.
This incremental nature of change reflects the limited interaction between the
IMF and the relevant organizational field. For instance, although the Fund con-
tinued deepening its interest in poverty reduction following the 1988 decisions,
also sponsoring a number of seminars and workshops for staff working on
countries with adjustment programs in place,10 these debates took place behind
closed doors, bringing together only high-level economists, mainly from inside the
Fund or at least uncritical of it.11 Without external stimuli, the established rules
and norms of the structurated field prevailed. Indeed, although new knowledge
and competing policy models were emerging on the treatment of poverty reduc-
tion in Fund-supported programs, these were constantly translated into the Fund’s
existing understanding of economic growth and macroeconomic stability. That is
to say, rather than experimenting with new ideas and policies, IMF staff and
Management ultimately relied on past institutional patterns, thereby refraining
from adopting significant changes. While engaging with questions of equity,
which, if taken seriously, would have implied radical changes to IMF practice, this
closed policy subsystem of Fund economists merely discussed the matter in a
philosophical way with no practical consequences.
Dismantlement
Whereas until 1998 change had been limited in scope, the situation changed
significantly the next year when the IMF promoted poverty reduction as a crucial
part of its adjustment programs. That is to say, the scope of change increased with
the creation of new instruments and the definition of new policy goals that
10 For instance, the 1995 conference entitled Headquarter’s Conference on Income Distribution and
Sustainable Growth and the 1998 conference on economic policy and equity focused on operational
aspects in addressing equity in Fund operations.
11 From inside the Fund, people working on social issues included Michel Camdessus, Joseph Stiglitz,
Vito Tanzi, Jack Boorman. Outside experts included Alberto Alesina, Anne Krueger, Nancy Birdsall, Dani
Rodrik, James Buchanan, Nicholas Stern, and Lawrence Summers.
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replaced old policies. Specifically, in 1999, the Fund established the Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) to make poverty reduction more central
to its lending and core operations in LICs. The PRGF replaced the SAF/ESAF and
changed the operational procedures for LICs for concessional lending. PRGF-
supported programs are now based on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs,
instead of Policy Framework Papers under SAF and ESAF) written by the
respective government with the participation of civil society and other aid agencies
and stakeholders. These PRSPs are considered by the Boards of the Bank and the
Fund for concessional lending. In addition to the creation of the PRGF, the Fund also
adopted a number of changes in its organizational structure, including the recruit-
ment of social scientists for the first time in its history and the creation of a Poverty
and Social Impact Analysis unit (PSIA) within FAD. Furthermore, in contrast to the
recent past, the IMF started including social benchmarks in its conditionality. In
short, the Fund deepened its involvement with poverty reduction by incorporating
this issue into the goals that its programs are expected to pursue.
The speed with which the Fund adopted these changes can still be explained in
terms of its peripheral position in the field, which facilitated the emergence of new
knowledge also through emulating other IOs. Indeed, the Fund’s policy changes
joined the PRSP initiative brought forward by the World Bank. After James D.
Wolfensohn took office as President of the World Bank in 1995, he started
significant reforms mainly in order to address the Bank’s growing legitimacy gap
emerging in the mid-1990s. Among these reforms was the so-called Comprehensive
Development Framework (CDF) adopted in 1996 that provided a framework for
significantly changing the Bank’s development approach toward a holistic view and
thus addressing many critical voices. The PRSP initiative can be seen as the
operational vehicle of this framework for LICs. It is solely based on Bank ideas.
The Fund joined the initiative when it was already underway.12
The more radical type of change as compared with that which emerged in the
late 1980s, then, can be attributed to the transformation of the relationship
between the Fund’s policy subsystem and its field. Indeed, the launch of the PRGF
took place against the backdrop of two independent events that reinforced each
other: the external review of the ESAF and the East Asian crisis, that in turn
increased the Fund’s interaction with its field. The ESAF review conducted by
Kwesi Botchwey in 1998 was the first of its kind. All reviews of Fund policies
before had been internal, prohibiting external actors from getting inside and
commenting on Fund operations and politics, and thus in turn potentially influ-
encing its policies. The review was requested by the IMF’s Executive Board in
1996 in order to complement an internal study carried out by the Fund’s Policy
Development and Review Department (PDR) and to address the growing external
criticisms leveled at the Fund. It revealed three main points of criticism. First,
12 Interview with Fund staff, March 2004.
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over the past 20 years, IMF programs had suffered from ownership problems,
which had hindered their implementation in developing countries. Second, ESAF
programs had not sufficiently focused on the protection of the poor. Third, one of
the findings questioned the blurred division of labor between the IOs, criticizing
their sometimes opposing recommendations to developing countries, as well as a
lack of centralization of aid flows (Botchwey et al., 1998).
The Asian crisis was another important catalyst for the reshaping of the Fund’s
relationship with its field. Similar to the surveillance case, the crisis triggered
external as well as internal critique of the Fund’s actions.13 As an immediate reaction
to the criticism arising, Camdessus stressed the need for a social pillar within the
international financial system (see Gupta et al., 2000). Yet, this criticism brought
forward with regard to the Fund’s role in the crisis was also reflected in the ESAF
review, whose publication coincided with the crisis. In this situation, the findings
contained in the ESAF review had a much greater impact. The crisis created a
moment where the IMF was placed under strong external performance pressure.
While previously critical policy reviews had been shrugged off, this time the power
relations in the field had changed and the IMF was in a weak position where it could
not simply ignore this criticism. As a consequence, the IMF’s policy subsystem
opened up and the organization collaborated with theWorld Bank and quickly joined
the PRSP initiative. Instead of clearing the matter up in-house, as on previous
occasions, the Fund hired Masood Ahmed, an economist who worked for the Bank
as Vice President of PREM, to be responsible for the design of the PRSP based on
Wolfensohn’s considerations on the CDF. As an expert on the PRSP and an insider of
the Bank, he managed to convince the Board to change the name of the Fund’s
main lending facility for LICs from ESAF to PRGF according to the new initiative
(interview with IMF staff 8 April 2004) through his appointment.
The PRSP initiative triggered enormous formal policy changes, which led to a
further opening of the Fund’s policy subsystem. The PRSP process as such now
required IMF staff to engage with civil society and other stakeholders and affected
groups in their loan negotiations (interview with IMF staff, March 2004). The
organization thus not only underwent major and profound changes, by way of its
participation in the PRSP, it also managed to address all three criticisms of the
ESAF review, that is, increased country ownership; a focus on poverty and social
development; and finally, a coordinated development strategy primarily with the
World Bank but also with other aid agencies.
In conclusion, if until the late 1990s the IMF had incorporated poverty in its
programs only at the margins, change intensified at the end of that decade. In parti-
cular, the increasing interaction of the IMF with its organizational field helped to
unlock the process of change. In short, the exogenous stimuli created the conditions
for more radical change to happen, leading to new policies dismantling the old.
13 Interview with IMF staff, March 2004 at the IMF headquarters.
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Conclusion
In recent years, scholars have grown increasingly interested in studying cases of
change within IOs. In this paper, we argued that they have not as yet system-
atically developed and tested hypotheses regarding different types of policy
change. We have thus attempted to enrich the research agenda by developing a
theoretical framework that contains a number of testable hypotheses to explain
the emergence of different types of change, the latter being conceptualized as
made up of two dimensions, that is speed and scope. Specifically, we suggested
that the dynamics of change are a function of the relationship between the IO and
its field of action: change is slower in a central than in a peripheral organization
and it is more radical in organizations with strong interactions with their field
than in those with closed policy subsystems. We then tested these hypotheses on
the IMF, studying the policy changes through which the Fund incorporated
financial sector surveillance and poverty reduction in its activities. Although
further empirical research is warranted to refine and test our arguments, the
findings largely support our initial hypotheses: change in surveillance was slower
than change in the field of poverty reduction where the Fund does not occupy a
central position. Still, in both cases, the scope of change intensified following the
opening of the Fund to the inputs of the actors in its organizational field.
By testing our hypotheses on the workings of a single IO, we found that
bureaucratic culture and member state preferences are important determinants of
why change takes place. However, they cannot alone explain what type of change
in fact occurs once change is set in motion. For instance, converting IMF sur-
veillance goals to financial sector surveillance occurred when the Fund’s prevalent
culture was still macroeconomic. Likewise, in spite of a supportive state coalition
for the Fund’s involvement with poverty reduction in the late 1970s or the G7
support for the reform of IMF surveillance in the aftermath of the Mexican crisis,
the ensuing policy changes were slow to materialize, although we would have
expected otherwise on the basis of the constellation of state interests. In short, our
findings suggest that the factors that are usually employed in constructivist/
rationalist explanations of organizational change can successfully explain the
causes of change but are only partly useful for accounting for the variety of
changes we traced in the empirical section. Studying the variety that change can
take will therefore require going beyond the ‘gladiatorial posturing typical of the
rationalist–constructivist debate’ (Barnett and Coleman, 2005: 615) and con-
sidering alternative elements that help to account for the different types of change.
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